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In the United Kingdom, in rather the same way as Marvin Goodfriend de-
scribed the U.S. experience, we went through a postwar period of ﬁrst stop/
go and then three severe recessions. There was the “great inﬂation” in
which inﬂation peaked at 27 percent in the mid-1970s—and averaged 13
percent a year right through the whole of that decade. It even averaged over
7 percent a year right through the 1980s under Mrs. Thatcher. Only since
1992 has inﬂation been consistently below 4 percent, and in fact it has
averaged a fraction under 2.5 percent of our target for the past ten years,
with growth averaging 2.5 percent a year and a little above the historical
trend. Inﬂation has been low and stable. Unemployment came down from
double-digit levels to 5 percent. And there have been forty-two consecutive
quarters of positive economic growth, which I think is unprecedented, at
least in our history.
But the question is, was inﬂation targeting necessary to that achieve-
ment? Whatever the answer to that question, I do think that inﬂation tar-
geting made our job easier by reducing the cost of making the right deci-
sions. Why is that? I think that monetary stability, or macroeconomic
stability more generally, is a bit like healthy living: you need to ﬁnd a sus-
tainable way of doing it. There is no point alternating between a crash diet
and bingeing. That is the boom/bust syndrome. The key is to ﬁnd a way of
setting policy that can be sustained. I think it is helpful to devise proce-
dures, whether they be thought of as monetary policy rules or whether they
are institutions that remove temptation, to help the weaker brethren ex-
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Committee.Let me very brieﬂy summarize what happens in the United Kingdom.
We have a target for consumer price inﬂation, which is a measure of retail
price inﬂation excluding the interest component on mortgages—the so-
called RPIX inﬂation—and we are instructed to aim at 2.5 percent. And
we are meant to aim for that at all times. It is a symmetric target; that is
quite clear in the remit. That is relevant, I think, to the paper by Jonas and
Mishkin (chap. 9, which I will discuss later), in which they see some prob-
lems in transition economies from the lack of symmetry.
Crucially, this target is set by the government. We do not set it ourselves
at the Bank of England. It is given to us by government. The decisions on
interest rates are then made by the Monetary Policy Committee, which
meets once a month by statute on ﬁxed dates, all announced well in ad-
vance. There are nine members of the committee, each with one vote. Dis-
senting votes are common. It is rare to have a unanimous vote from the
committee.
We spend a long time on the forecast procedure using a range of models.
Sometimes I think that we have more econometric models than one could
possibly want. In the end, however, the judgment of the committee has to
play a key role, and we can come back to that later. We publish our minutes
thirteen days after the announcement of the decision. The minutes contain
the voting pattern, and they contain a description of the arguments that
were given during the discussion to justify views on particular parts of the
analysis or indeed on the ﬁnal judgment on interest rates. Once a quarter,
we publish a formal forecast for inﬂation in our Inﬂation Report.
This systematic process should be contrasted with what went before in
the United Kingdom. No notice of when policy decisions would be made
was given. The ﬁnancial markets had no notice of when interest rates
would be decided, so it could be any day. That certainly kept them glued to
the screens.
Of course, in this setting a serious economic discussion did not carry
much weight. It was the ability to swing the argument on the basis of what
happened at the time. And politics intruded a very great deal. So what has
happened in Britain is that we switched, for better or worse—and I think
it is clearly for the better—to a much more systematic professional pro-
cedure, which you have had in the Federal Open Markets Committee
(FOMC) for a very long time. Now, I think this may well be part of the suc-
cess of inﬂation targeting in other countries as well.
There are four key points I want to make. One is about constrained dis-
cretion and inﬂation expectations. A second is about inﬂation targeting
and the committee process itself. A third is about transparency and ac-
countability, and a fourth is one that Martin Feldstein has alluded to,
which is that inﬂation targeting does not give all the answers. That is, there
are many diﬃcult aspects of the economic outlook that are all about seri-
ous economics and discussing what is likely to happen in the future, but
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they would be by any other framework.
On the ﬁrst point, constrained discretion and inﬂation expectations, any
monetary policy can be thought of as a combination of an inﬂation target
in the medium term and a response to shocks as they occur. In that sense,
any coherent policy reaction found can be described as inﬂation targeting.
I like to see inﬂation targeting as being about—to use Ben Bernanke and
Frederic Mishkin’s phrase—“constrained discretion.” It sets up a process
in which the Central Bank has to explain what it is doing. Now, this has two
implications, I think. One is that it is easier, I believe, to inﬂuence inﬂation
expectations. Certainly part of our success has been that we have brought
inﬂation expectations down; whether you measure them by bond yields, in-
dex-linked versus conventional yields, or surveys, inﬂation expectations in
Britain are now pretty well anchored on the 2.5 percent target. And that
makes monetary policy easier by giving monetary policy a bit more time
to respond. We are not worried that an inﬂationary shock is likely to lead
immediately to an upward revision or downward revision of inﬂation ex-
pectations, feeding through very quickly as it might have done before into
inﬂation expectations, wage bargaining, and then prices. This point is
stressed in the paper by Orphanides and Williams (chap. 5), which we are
going to discuss. It matters because if you let inﬂation expectations drift
too far away from the target, you can end up in quite serious diﬃculty with
a costly process to bring them back again.
Another aspect of our process is that it is one in which economists have
some comparative advantage. This is unlike the old British amateur tradi-
tion, in which mystery and mystique were the essence of central banking.
In the United Kingdom, this has been something of a sea-change. This may
or may not be true elsewhere. In Britain, however, the central bank is now
seen as an institution that is about making professional economic judg-
ments in a way that it was not before, and I think that really matters.
I have always thought of inﬂation targeting as a way of implementing the
optimal policy reaction function, setting the optimal policy by means of
constrained discretion within the inﬂation-targeting framework. In chap-
ter 2, Lars Svensson and Michael Woodford are going to explain why it is
just a bit more complicated than I used to think. Nevertheless, I still think
that the idea of a framework is to get as close as possible to what you, the
theorist, think of as optimal monetary policy. This should be done in a way
that forces the central bank to explain and, by accountability, helps to keep
it on track and make the right decisions. That is the ﬁrst point.
The second point is the committee process. This is a pure observation
based on the U.K. experience. Even with nine professional economists, my
belief is that in a committee without a clear objective there would be scope
for people to set their own agenda. Members might try to argue that their
view of the objective is the right one and other people’s the wrong one. This
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the economy and the technical judgments needed to hit a given target.
What is clearly true about our Monetary Policy Committee, and I do not
think this was obvious ex ante, is that the entire discussion is focused on a
technical economic judgment about what it is necessary to do to hit the in-
ﬂation target. Now, you can talk about whether the target is desirable or
not, but in terms of making sure that people around the table do what they
are supposed to do, this is highly eﬀective. Many committees I have sat on
have had the property that people often try to gain leadership of the com-
munity by moving toward the center, forming a consensus in which they ex-
ercise some leadership. They are never judged on whether the outcome of
the decision is good or bad; instead, they are judged according to whether
they are strong committee people.
Individual accountability, allied to the fact that the target is given to us
from outside, means that the nature of our discussions is absolutely, solidly
focused on the state of the economy and what we need to do to interest
rates to keep inﬂation on track to hit the target. We have a two-day meet-
ing in which the ﬁrst day is about the diagnosis of the economy, and the
second day is the treatment, the level of interest rates. Those meetings are
more successful than any other meetings I have been to at committees be-
cause there is a very clear objective.
The third point concerns transparency, accountability, and legitimacy.
Our split between the government setting the target and the central bank
making decisions is of course instrument independence, to use Stan Fi-
scher’s phrase. But we go out around the country and to Parliament to ex-
plain why our policy decisions will help to meet the target, and having a
clear target gives us a natural focus. I would say that this delegation of de-
cisions to the Monetary Policy Committee, which actually came in May
1997, has in fact proved very popular. This was not to be expected. Many
people thought that no government would make the Bank independent be-
cause Parliament would complain that it had lost control. The press would
complain that there was no democratic mandate and that people would feel
that we were unaccountable.
That has turned out not to be the case. First of all, the business commu-
nity likes to feel that there is a group of people who actually know what
they are talking about setting monetary policy. In fact, it is the only thing
we are supposed to be talking about. Second, we are accountable in well-
deﬁned ways, and I think that the pressure we have been put under to ex-
plain ourselves has actually beneﬁted us.
One of the great beneﬁts of having a committee is that people can see
what the issues are, and even if members of the committee disagree and put
diﬀerent arguments, I think the great success of our system and that which
has been a real lesson to us has been never to claim that the decision was
obvious. Always point out that there were arguments on each occasion for
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and then everyone feels that at least the relevant arguments are being put
on the table.
Finally, on the last point, inﬂation targeting, as I said, is a way of think-
ing about policy. It is not an automatic answer to all the diﬃcult policy
questions. I think the asset price question is probably the best example of
that. We have faced major asset price movements, so it is not as if we have
not actually been challenged in our framework so far. We have had a rise in
the eﬀective exchange rate index of more than 20 percent, both nominal
and real, in the early part of the period, which has persisted almost until
now. We had the sharp rise in stock prices and then a sharp fall in stock
prices. More recently, we have had increases in house prices of between 25
and 30 percent.
I think the diﬃculty is to work out what these movements mean for the
risks in the future. My feeling is that any policy decision has to take into
account the entire distribution of future outcomes for inﬂation and output,
and not just the expected values in some exact future period. In my speech
in November 2003 at the London School of Economics, I talked about the
fact that inﬂation targeting as a framework can, I think, provide a way to
discuss this. Sharp asset price movements raise risks that mean there is a
potential trade-oﬀ between the risk of a small shortfall of the inﬂation tar-
get now relative to a bigger risk of a large deviation of inﬂation from the
target in the future. In the conventional discussion, there is a trade-oﬀ be-
tween the volatility of inﬂation and the volatility of output. Similarly, in
choosing the horizon over which you bring inﬂation back to the target,
there is a choice about whether to accept in the short run inﬂation a little
short of the inﬂation target, but to do so knowingly, against the risks in-
volved in a potentially large deviation of inﬂation from target further
ahead at a longer horizon.
I think this is a tricky question to which there is no simple answer. It is
not something that is peculiar to inﬂation targeting, and other frameworks
have other methods of dealing with it. But I don’t think it is inconsistent
with inﬂation targeting, although it does merit some separate discussion.
We have spent a good deal of time and eﬀort building a constituency for
low inﬂation. This involves trying to build public support for low inﬂation,
which I think is important because of the very interesting work done on
Germany showing that the more distant were the hyperinﬂation episodes,
the more the younger generations lacked commitment to low inﬂation.
Thus, you cannot just rely on the memory of boom and bust in the past to
keep people committed to low inﬂation. We need a positive program to
persuade people, and having a clear inﬂation target has helped. Like the
Federal Reserve, we have our competition for schools, and ours is called
Target 2.5.
Martin Feldstein had six issues to discuss, whereas I have ﬁve questions
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people would agree that inﬂation targeting makes it easier for the weaker
brethren—that is, most people in central banking—to do the right thing.
Second, why is it that countries that have adopted inﬂation targeting are
generally very happy with it? Is it just that they have beneﬁted from a very
benign period, or have they found this a sustainable, healthy way of living?
Third, what is it that a central bank should be trying to communicate? Is
it a policy reaction function, or is it something more complicated? Is it
what central banks are learning about the economy, in addition to a policy
reaction function? I often think that Alan Greenspan’s speeches are almost
a conversation with the public about the issues that arise when thinking
about the economy. I think we have tried to do some of that, too.
Fourth, how serious are the problems posed by issues such as asset price
inﬂation and about the horizon over which inﬂation should be brought
back to target? Finally, how can we focus the attention of both decision
makers and the public much more on the risks around the central projec-
tion than on just the central projection of a forecast for the expected value
of our projection?
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